Liability and Responsibility of the State of Registration or the Flag State in Respect of Sea-Going Vessels, Aircraft and Spacecraft Registered by National Registration Authorities by Sucharitkul, Sompong
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
Fall 2006
Liability and Responsibility of the State of
Registration or the Flag State in Respect of Sea-
Going Vessels, Aircraft and Spacecraft Registered by
National Registration Authorities
Sompong Sucharitkul
Golden Gate University School of Law, ssucharitkul@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Law of the Sea Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
54 Am. J. of Comp. Law 409 (Suppl., Fall 2006).
LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE 
OF REGISTRATION OR THE FLAG STATE IN 
RESPECT OF SEA-GOING VESSELS, AIRCRAFT 
AND SPACECRAFT REGISTERED BY NATIONAL 
REGISTRATION AUTHORITIES 
SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL 
Reprinted from 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 
Volume LIV, Fall 2006, Supplement 
Copyright © 2006 by the American Society of Comparative Law, Inc. 
SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL* 
Liability and Responsibility of the State of 
Registration or the Flag State in Respect of Sea-Going 
Vessels, Aircraft and Spacecraft Registered by 
National Registration Authorities 
I. AN INDUCTIVE APPROACH 
The topic selected for this report forms part of a broader picture: 
"the Liability of Registration authorities," which embraces a wider 
scope of enquiry, principally covering an infinite variety of interna-
tional regulations within comparable national legal orders. Civil lia-
bility may require consideration of legal questions for which practical 
solution may only be found beyond the confines of internal law, in the 
choice of applicable law as part of private international law, or ulti-
mately in the direct or indirect application of a rule of public interna-
tional law, as recognized by States and incorporated in negotiated 
provisions of a Treaty. 
As the main branch of the area of the law under study is III. D. 
Air and Maritime Law/Droit Aerien et Maritime, there appears to be 
ample justification for undertaking an examination of the question of 
liability, not only by comparing the rules in one legal system with 
several others, but also by comparing analogous rules adopted for 
maritime transport with those applicable to civil and commercial avi-
ation, and even to space travel. 
In the ultimate analysis, the question of civil liability of an 
agency of a State or an organ of an international organization per-
forming registration functions cannot escape the control or regulation 
by a competent authority of the prevailing international legal order. 
Nor for that matter could liability avoid the application of the rele-
vant rules of international law. States and international organiza-
tions exercising the functions of registering all modes of international 
transport are clearly and equally responsible before the law in the 
eyes of international law. In this connection, international law is un-
dergoing a constant process of evolution to crystallize a minimum 
* Sompong Sucharitkul, D. Phil., D.C.L. (Oxon); Docteur-en-Droit (Paris); 
LL.M. (Harvard); of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law; Associate Dean and Distin-
guished Professor of International and Comparative Law, Golden Gate University 
School of Law, San Francisco, U.S.A. This report was completed in Bangkok in Au-
gust 2005. 
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universal standard of responsibility and liability on the part of States 
and international agencies in the field of maritime transport as well 
as in civil and commercial aviation, as indeed equally also in space 
flight and space voyage. 
The present study will follow a logical pattern of systemic se-
quence. First, it will in due course examine the practice of the United 
States with regard to the liability of its registration authorities with 
its limitations and qualifications, inevitably engaging the State re-
sponsibility of the United States in respect of any harm or injury, 
physical or financial, incurred by non-nationals within or outside the 
United States as the result of a wrongful act, or negligent handling, 
or willful conduct committed by an agency of the United States Gov-
ernment, or an independent contractor acting on behalf of the State, 
in connection with the registration of a sea-going vessel of the size 
and category and with the permit to fly United States flag. 
In the second place, the study will address the varying require-
ments and diverse qualifications for registration of an aircraft of dif-
ferent designs and purposes to enable such vehicles of transport to 
take to the air and to be air-borne or to take off on a flight within or 
across and beyond the national boundaries of the United States for 
the carriage of goods and passengers or other peaceful purposes. 
These are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) of the United States. The liability of 
the registration authorities is governed by federal legislation super-
imposed on various State legislative requirements. The civil liabili-
ties and their limitations, exemptions and privileges as well as 
immunities of the United States competent authorities for the pro-
cess of examination, attestation and registration are regulated by 
State law as well as by Federal Regulations. 
The basic needs and requirements of proof of ownership and air-
worthiness for purposes of eligibility for registration in the United 
States are essentially not far different from those for registration of 
sea-going vessels with permits to fly United States flags. 
Finally, liabilities for registration authorities in respect of space 
vehicles, space objects and satellites closely resemble those of air-
craft, as space travel and space shuttle services are analogous to air 
traffic, flight navigation or civil and commercial aviation. The treat-
ment of the three means of transport, sea voyage, flight or passage 
through space, is sometimes merged or combined under the heading 
of multi-modal transport, comprehending the carriage of goods and 
passengers by land, by sea including waterways, and by air including 
eventually space transport. 
The current survey of State practice in the three modes or means 
of international transport may lend itself to some tentative conclu-
sions, based on an empirical comparison of State practice particularly 
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the United States model as well as international standards. It is con-
ceivable that there may be an intermediary regime between maritime 
and air law as between aviation and space shuttle. This study will 
follow an inductive method. 
II. MARITIME LAW 
A. General Considerations 
Maritime law constitutes a branch of the law within a national 
legal system, designed to regulate the carriage of goods and passen-
gers by sea, or the carrying trade by water, traversing the sea or the 
ocean through national or international waterways. It does not nec-
essarily preclude consideration of safety and security at sea, in the 
ocean or hazards to navigation whether in the nature of piracy jure 
gentium or terrorism at sea, domestic as well as international. 
The current survey is confined to certain legal aspects of civil lia-
bility of registration authorities for any harm, damage, or injury to 
person or property resulting from the operation of a sea-going vessel 
especially after it has been duly inspected and registered with certifi-
cates of documentation and sea-worthiness as well as permit to oper-
ate under the flag of a particular State, in this case, the United 
States of America as a point of departure. 
Under the Law of the Sea Convention 1982,1 every ship must 
have a nationality and fly a national flag of a State. A sea-going ves-
sel may not fly more than one flag. 2 However, it can fly a flag of an 
international organization, such as the United Nations or ASEAN. 
Every sea-going vessel is additionally required to carry a paper, or 
certificate of documentation, indicating its size, tonnage replacement, 
construction ship-yard and a name for purpose of its identification. It 
has to be equipped with safety devices and radio telecommunication 
set to ensure its location or geographical coordinates at sea, its 
known point of departure and declared destination of a voyage. It 
has to have a call-sign to be able to announce its whereabouts and its 
intention to enter and visit a port of call. These are also needed to 
report an emergency to call for assistance, salvage service or rescue 
at sea. 
International law does not impose on every maritime State nor 
land-locked State any detailed regulation or specific requirement for 
1. See in particular, Articles 90-91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
signed at the Montigo Bay, Jamaica, December 10, 1982, and entered into force on 
November 16, 1994 among various States. However, Thailand and USA have not rati-
fied the Convention, although, except for Part XI, most other substantive parts reflect 
the current status of customary international law on the subject. 
2. See id., Part VII, the High Seas, Articles 92-100 of the Convention Official 
Text with Annexes and Index, UN. NY, 1983. 
.• 
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registration of a ship with a permit to fly a national flag. 3 Rather 
every State has the fullest authority to adopt, modify, amend and 
vary at will the necessary requirements for registration of a vessel as 
part of its flag, either as a merchant marine, a fishing vessel, a ferry, 
a tanker, a transport ship, a cruise vessel, a man of war or battle 
ship, a cruiser, a torpedo-boat, an auxiliary vessel, a hospital boat, a 
sub-marine, a destroyer, a nuclear sub-marine, a coast guard, a frig-
ate, a tug boat, an explorer or training vessel for various educational, 
scientific and experimental purposes, and ultimately an aircraft car-
rier and an aquapolis.4 It is clearly beyond the scope of this brief 
survey to examine national qualifications and requirements of every 
maritime nation for each of the categories of the above-mentioned 
vessels. 
The present study starts with maritime law and incidentally 
touches upon some of the requirements and qualifications for a vessel 
to be registered under a United States flag, namely, ownership and 
place of construction in order to ascertain the nature and extent of 
the liabilities and responsibilities of the registration authorities. In 
the United States practice, the task of testing, attesting or verifying 
the qualifications and requirements for registration is not infre-
quently delegated or assigned to what is known as a 'Societe de clas-
sification' or "Classification Society.' Performance of these delegated 
tasks by expert societies does not exonerate the flag State of its pri-
mary or principal responsibility. Whatever faults and imperfections 
or 'fautes de service' committed in the performance of these functions 
are attributed, as they are imputable, to the State. 
B. Status of Ships and Liability to Arrest in Foreign Jurisdictions 
1. Jurisdictional and Procedural Issues 
One of the first questions to be examined relates to jurisdictional 
issues whether an act of State or an act of the State, exercising its 
sovereign authority in the discharge of its inspection duties and func-
tions is subject to the jurisdiction of any authority, administrative or 
judicial, within or outside the United States. This study will address 
a few topical questions relating to the liability of the flag State or its 
registration agencies or authorities in any civil proceedings, involving 
such questions as the certificate of sea-worthiness of a vessel, its reg-
istered name, title-holder and changes. This may affect its prompt 
release or loss of standing of claimant or absence of jurisdiction of an 
international instance. 
3. Id., Article 91(2): obligation to issue document. 
4. Japan launched an aquapolis, a submersible marine city to farm under-water 
plants and to cultivate fish cultures. 
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It is useful to appreciate certain procedural distinctions or pecu-
liarities of a suit in admiralty before a judicial instance of a common 
law system such as the United States and the United Kingdom. In 
the traditional theories of the common law, a ship is a unique species 
of chattel in the sense that an action can be brought against a ship as 
such in rem, where the writ or libel in rem against the ship can be 
served by posting the writ on the main mask, but it is at the same 
time addressed to the owner and master or captain of the vessel also 
in personam. A proceeding in rem against a ship can be initiated with 
its arrest or seizure ad fundandam jurisdictionum, which, strange 
but true, can be served and effected not only against the ship that has 
itself been at fault, but also in its absence, against any sister ship of 
the same fleet. 5 A ship is at times considered fictitiously as a floating 
territory,6 but that fiction is exploded as a legal basis for territorial 
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the flag State is based on nationality 
of the vessel as evidenced by the national flag it flies and not on any 
fiction ofterritoriality similar to the exploded theory of extraterritori-
ality of embassies entailing inviolability of diplomatic and consular 
premises.7 
2. Liability in rem 
The liability of a ship in rem is comparable to noxal liability or 
liability of the owner under Roman Law at various periods to surren-
der the vicious animal, such as a mad dog. The owner of a vicious dog 
that inflicted injury upon a person would be liable vicariously for the 
injury caused by the dog. The owner could choose to keep the dog and 
pay the compensation or penalties for damage caused or surrender 
the dog to the victim. Thus, noxal surrender resembles the arrest of a 
vessel to ensure that the harm caused by the vessel is redressed ei-
ther by the owner or master of the ship agreeing to compensate for 
the loss suffered or from the proceeds of sale of the vessel arrested. 
By the same token, a complainant in the ancient Roman legal system 
could detain the vicious dog as security for payment of compensation 
by its owner for the injury inflicted by the dog8 in the event the owner 
wished to have his dog back. Proof of ownership is invariably con-
tained in the registration paper, hence the liability and responsibility 
of the Registration authorities to register any transfer of title to the 
ship. 
5. See I Congreso del Partido, [1983] AC 244. House of Lords Decision relating to 
the Playa Larga and the Marble Island, Cuban ships. See also Lord Atkin in the Cris-
tina [1938] A.C. at p. 490. 
6. See the reasoning of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the SS 
Lotus, (France v. Turkey) 1927, PCIJ Report Series A. No. 10; 2 Hudson World Ct. 
Rep. 20. 
7. See EDWARD R. ADAIR, THE EXTERRITORIALITY OF EMBASSIES IN THE XVITH AND 
XVIITH CENTURIES (1929). 
8. See Lex Aquilia, A.D. 287, DIGEST 49. 
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3. International Regulation of Arrest of Ships 
The institution of noxal liability or noxal surrender was normal 
in more primitive societies. Today, traces of such practice could only 
be found as a security or cautio for payment of compensation in dis-
charge ofliability for a tort or civil wrong. Nevertheless, the arrest of 
vessels has become more frequent in modern maritime law, both com-
parative and international. The frequent uses of arrest of ships have 
led to an international endeavor to put the current practice on a more 
rational and generally accepted basis. Ninety-five sea-faring nations 
including the United States and Thailand as well as Hong Kong and 
Macao, attended the UNIIMO Diplomatic Conference on Arrest of 
Ships from 1 to 12 March 1999 in Geneva. The Conference was also 
attended by International Organizations, as observers, such as the 
Arab Labor Organization, OAU, OAS, OIC and the Intergovernmen-
tal Organization for International Carriage by Rail. Several NGOs 
also attended the Conference as observers.9 The draft articles were 
prepared by the joint UNCTADIIMO Intergovernmental Group of Ex-
perts on Maritime Liners and Mortgages and Related subjects. 10 
The UN/IMO Convention on Arrest of Ships 1999 serves to 
standardize and regulate rules and procedures for arrest and release 
of ships. As indicated in its Preamble, 11 the States Parties to the 
Convention recognize the desirability of facilitating the harmonious 
and orderly development of world sea-borne trade and are convinced 
of the necessity for a legal instrument establishing international uni-
formity in the field of arrest of ships, taking into account recent de-
velopments in related fields. Many basic terms have been defined for 
the purposes. The power of arrest is vested in the Court of the State 
party in which the arrest is effected in respect only of a maritime 
claim as defined. The purpose of the arrest is to obtain security for a 
maritime claim for which the owner or demise charterer is liable. 
Sister-ship jurisdiction is permissible for the arrest of a ship or ships 
owned by a person liable for the maritime claim, or is otherwise 
chartered to that person.12 A ship so arrested is to be released when 
sufficient security has been provided in a satisfactory form. 13 
9. See documents NCONF. 188/6, 19 March 1999; also NCONF. 188/2, and 188/ 
5. 
10. See document TD/B/IGB.l/5; NCONF.188/3 Add. 103; and NCONF.188/2. 
The United States attended and signed the final Act. Indonesia, the Philippines, Sin-
gapore, Thailand and Vietnam also signed the Final Act. Most sea-faring nations 
signed the Final Act, including Switzerland. 
11. See document NCONF.188/6, Preambles. 
12. See id., Article 3 (1) and (2). 
13. Id., Article 4 (1) and (2). 
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C. Responsibility of a Flag State in Respect of Sea-Going Vessels 
Flying Its Flag 
That the flag State has primary, if not indeed exclusive, jurisdic-
tion over all ships flying its flag on the high seas, no one today can 
dispute, nor can anyone deny the predominant authority of the flag 
State. Opinion and practice of States lack uniformity with regard to 
the nature and extent of the responsibility of the flag State in respect 
of the activities of sea-going vessels flying its flag. The exercise of the 
authority to register a ship by whatever body or agency as a United 
States vessel entitled to fly United States flag is attributable to the 
United States. 
The prevailing opinion and practice of the United States appear 
to be the most outstanding if not indeed the most extensive, not only 
in regard to the basic jurisdiction over the vessels, but also with re-
spect to the obligations and responsibilities that the United States 
Government is prepared to undertake to protect and defend the 
safety and security of all ships flying United States flag on the high-
seas or anywhere else. The United States practice has been rela-
tively consistent in its assumption of the function and responsibility 
to preserve and protect the integrity of the United States from any 
armed attack by whomsoever and wherever launched. Different cate-
gories of ships merit different consideration. 
1. Man-of-War 
The most obvious example of United States position and policy is 
its treatment of any armed attack against or upon its warship or gov-
ernment ship being invariably regarded as an attack against the 
United States. This may prompt a series of response to the armed 
attack, as in various instances such as the Gulf of Tonkin incident, 14 
the Gulf of Sidra incidents, 15 the attack against the USS Pueblo off 
the coast of North Korea, 16 and the USS Cole off the shore of 
Yemen. 17 United States warships have been targets of attack even 
14. This has led US Congress to adopt a resolution authorizing the President to 
commit US armed forces, including ground troops, to fight in Vietnam in the sixties 
and early seventies. 
15. In 1981, the US took occasion to respond to the two attacking Libyan Fitters, 
and after downing both Libyan Fitters, the US fighter aircraft removed the shore 
batteries and radar stations of Libya during a missiles exercise of the USS Nimitz 
(CVN-68) in the high-seas in the Gulf of Sidra, which Libya had claimed to be within 
its territorial waters. This was generally viewed as an exercise of US self defense 
against Libya. Another incident recurred in 1989 resulting in two US F14 Tomcats 
shooting down the Libyan Mig-23 Flogger-Es. 
16. The USS Pueblo was attacked by North Korean forces in the Sea of Japan in 
1968 and its crew members were detained for 11 months before they were released. 
17. The USS Cole was attacked by a suicide squad of the Al-Qaeda in October 
2000. 
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from friendly fires. 18 This accounts for a stern position taken by the 
United States in response to armed attacks against its warships, as if 
it were an armed attack or aggression against the territorial integrity 
of the United States itself. 
There was not much adverse or critical reaction from world pub-
lic opinion as to the duties or responsibilities of the United States 
Government to defend and protect its own land from armed attack-
ers, and to extend these functions to cover warships as if they consti-
tuted 'floating territories' of the United States, hence the revival of a 
kind of a long exploded fiction of territoriality attached to a man-of-
war. Nevertheless, the extent to which the United States could exer-
cise the right of self-defense in such cases has not escaped severe and 
in several instances justifiable criticisms. The case on point was the 
self-protection or alleged self-defense of the USS Vincennes 19 against 
possible attacks by vessels or aircraft which turned out to be an inno-
cent Iranian civilian Airbus carrying Muslim passengers from Tehe-
ran to Saudi Arabia to do their annual pilgrimage. 
2. Private-Owned or Private-Operated Vessels 
The fiction of territoriality may be said to have been over-
stretched when applied to ordinary sea-going vessels not forming 
part of the United States navy. United States armed intervention in 
numerous instances for the purpose of providing protection for 
United States commercial flags have not been supported by world 
public opinion, nor clearly established rule of customary interna-
tional law. The Mayaguez Incident (1975)20 in the Gulf of Thailand, 
was the case on point, when the Mayaguez, flying a United States 
flag, was attacked and seized by piratical rebel forces of the Khmers 
Rouges, the United States Navy decided to respond by attacking 
Kampuchea under cover of self-defense to liberate and recover the 
Mayaguez. 21 
18. On 17 May 1987, the USS Stark was attacked by two air-to-surface missiles 
from an Iraqi Air Force F1 Mirage, being mistaken for an Iranian frigate. 
19. On 3 July 1988, the Iranian Airbus 300, IR655, was downed by the USS Vin-
cennes surface to air missiles. The error offact or mistake of identity could only afford 
an excuse to establish absence of criminal intent or mens rea, but it could in no way 
exonerate the US Government from the secondary obligation to wipe out the conse-
quences of its internationally wrongful act, though not necessarily criminal. 
20. Piracy ex jure gentium was not unknown in international law. Pirates are 
treated as hostes generis humani (enemies of mankind), and as such can be attacked 
anywhere on the high-seas or on dry land to deny them shelter to provide safety for 
international maritime trade. 
21. It should be noted that the Thai Government specifically notified the US 
forces in Thailand not to use any Thai base to launch an attack on Kampuchea or on 
the Mayaguez. But the US armed forces did not heed that warning. 
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3. Reflagging of Private-Owned Tankers 
The question of reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers as United States 
vessels flying United States flag deserves serious consideration. It is 
not without significance that a United States registration authority 
could register or change the registration of a Kuwaiti tanker and al-
lowed it to fly a United States flag. The apparent purpose is to per-
mit the United States armed forces to provide effective protection to 
the reflagged US - Kuwaiti tankers, carrying Iraqi crude oil from the 
Persian Gulf. 
Many incidents occurred in the height of Iran-Iraq war of the 
1980s. The United States was not a party to the bilateral armed con-
flict. Its interest was to protect the safety of navigation in the Per-
sian Gulf which was the theatre for naval warfare between the two 
warring Gulf Nations. Under the law of international armed con-
flicts, the United States should observe strict neutrality and refrain 
from taking side. 
In the case of an attack on the USS Stark in 1987, the United 
States Government did not take any measure of self-defense by re-
sponding to the mistaken Iraqi attack. On the other hand, the 
United States Navy went to the length of destroying Iranian Oil Plat-
forms in a series of forcible measures taken against Iran. The Inter-
national Court of Justice in the case between Iran and the United 
States on the destruction of the Oil Platforms expressed no sympathy 
with United States theory of self-defense.22 
Nicaragua v. U.S.A. (1986) (Military and para-military activities 
in and against Nicaragua) amply demonstrated a fundamental lack 
of understanding on the part of the United States of the basic princi-
ple of international law of collective self-defense, which requires a re-
quest of assistance by the victim of an armed attack. In the 
Nicaragua Case, the United States could provide no evidence of any 
such request. The United States view of international law has been 
proven to be inaccurate, but the injury was already inflicted upon in-
nocent victims. The problem remains not only for reparation under 
the law of State responsibility, but also civil liability to be discharged 
in respect of harms done to individuals in the eyes of international 
law as well as under the rules of conflict of laws or private interna-
tional law. 
Questions of liability for tankers on the part of the flag State are 
borne out by State practice. The Brussels Conference in the 1970s23 
22. ICJ Report (2004) 6 November 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1334 (2003). 
23. An International Fund was set up, contributed by States Members to abate 
the consequences of oil pollution at sea caused by tankers. Oil pollution of the seas is 
regulated by the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
by Oil, London, 12 May 1954, 12 US T. 2989, TIAG No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, US is a 
Party. 
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on the prevention of Oil Pollution from Tankers showed a high degree 
of awareness on the part of Maritime States and Sea-faring nations of 
the responsibility incumbent upon the flag States to see to it that 
tankers flying their flag are in sea-worthy conditions according to in-
ternational standards of safety. Thus, in 1975, a Japanese tanker of 
the Sanko Line, named the Showa Maru, struck some under-water 
rocks in the Malacca and Singapore Straits and suffered leakages 
which resulted in oil pollution of the Strait States of Malacca and 
Singapore Straits (Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia). The Japa-
nese Government took no time to make necessary reparations and 
took immediate steps to adopt precautionary measures to prevent 
further repetitions of such incidents. An international Committee 
was set up to explore ways and means to enhance the safety and se-
curity of navigation through the Malacca and Singapore Straits. 24 
Civil liabilities attaching to the tankers as well as to their flag States 
abound in the annals of maritime transport. The Torrey Canyon25 
and the Prestige26 have been as notorious as the Exxon Valdez. 27 
4. Protection of the Fishing Fleets and Liabilities of the Flag 
State for Violations of Conservation Measures 
Not only the United States but also the United Kingdom Govern-
ments, had taken upon themselves to protect their fishing fleet at one 
time or another. For instance in the fifties, certain Latin American 
countries extended their exclusive fishing zones to 200 miles as 'Mar 
patrimonial' to conserve and protect the exploitation of living re-
sources, the United States Navy had to escort its tuna fishing fleet to 
fish in the proclaimed 'Mar patrimonial' to preempt naval incidents. 
The United Kingdom also protected British fishing fleet in the cod 
wars off the coast of Norway when Norway enforced its four-miles 
territorial sea, and later also with Iceland when the latter proclaimed 
an extended exclusive fishing zone of fifty miles. However, after the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted the 
1982 Convention with provisions on Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZ), 28 the Reagan Administration issued a Proclamation in 198329 
proclaiming United States EEZ, but at the same time denouncing 
24. See, for instance, Sompong Sucharitkul, Le Statut Juridique des Detroits de 
Malacca et de Singapour, 1994, No. 8, Revue Espaces et Ressources Maritimes, 
Universite de Nice, France. 
25. The United Kingdom destroyed a tanker without the consent of the flag State. 
The Torrey Canyon disaster prompted the adoption of the International Convention 
Relating to Intervention on the Highseas in cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 1969, 26 
U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068. The United States is a party to this Convention. 
26. The Spanish Government took steps to preempt oil pollution from The Pres-
tige to reach the Spanish coast. This diversion could endanger the French coast. 
27. See Gold, Marine Pollution Liability after 'Exxon Valdez': The United States 
'AU-or-Nothing Lottery!' 22 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 423 (1991). 
28. Part V, Article 55.15 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. UN 
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, UN Sales No. E83 V.3. 
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United States exclusive possession or control over the highly migra-
tory species, i.e., free-swimming tunas within the United States 
EEZs. By so limiting, the United States hoped that it could maintain 
a more consistent position when it came to the fishing of highly mi-
gratory species by United States tuna fishing fleets inside the EEZ of 
the fifteen South Pacific Forum States. This consistent United States 
attitude appeared to be in direct conflict with the notion of EEZs 
which allowed coastal States to regulate and manage the stocks in-
cluding migratory species within their EEZ. Kiribati arrested at least 
one such United States fishing vessel and refused to release the re-
calcitrant vessel without posting of appropriate bond. 
The United States Government continued to maintain its unten-
able position, although seeing that Japan had agreed to give financial 
and technical assistances to the South Pacific Forum States in return 
for licenses for Japanese fishing fleet to fish in their EEZ. The 
United States was not persuaded until the Russian started to fish in 
the EEZ of these South Pacific nations with legitimate license, having 
also given necessary financial assistance together with highly sophis-
ticated fishing technologies to these South Pacific States. 30 
Apart from the duty of protection of the fishing fleets, States 
have also assumed several obligations under the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the conserva-
tion and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks. Part V of the Convention enumerates the duties of the 
flag State. In effect, Article 18 stipulates that 'A State whose vessels 
fish on the high seas shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
ensure that vessels flying its flag comply with sub-regional and re-
gional conservation and management measures and that such vessels 
do not engage in any activities which undermine the effectiveness of 
such measures.'31 
The measures taken by a State in respect of vessels flying its flag 
include control on the high seas by means of fishing licenses, authori-
zations or permits, in accordance with any applicable procedures 
agreed at the sub-regional, regional or global level.32 A State is 
under an obligation not to authorize the use of vessels flying its flag 
for fishing on the high sea if it is not able to exercise effectively its 
29. President Reagan Proclamation of the US EEZs on 10 March 1983, Proclama-
tion No. 5030, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 600 (1983). 
30. See William 0. McLean and Sompong Sucharitkul, Fisheries Management 
and Development in the EEZ: The North, South and Southwest Pacific Experience, in 
63 NoTRE DAME LAw REVIEW 492 (1988). 
31. Article 18 (1) of the Agreement for the Implementation of the provisions of the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to conservation and management 
of straddling stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, adopted 4 August, 1995, opened 
for signature, 4 December 1995; 34 ILM1542 (1995). 
32. !d., Article 18 (2). 
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responsibilities in respect of such vessels under the Convention and 
this Agreement.33 In addition, the flag States are required to estab-
lish regulations, to apply terms and conditions to the license, authori-
zation or permit sufficient to fulfill any sub-regional, regional or 
global obligations of the flag State, to prohibit fishing on the high 
seas for unlicensed or unauthorized vessels, and to require such ves-
sels to carry the license, authorization and permit on board at all 
times.34 
These are but a few examples of the duties of the flag State to 
take measures to ensure compliance with international regulations 
at various levels, sub-regional, regional and global, including detailed 
requirements regarding marking of the vessels, fishing gears, timely 
reporting of the position of the vessels and the catch of target and 
non-target species through such means as observers program, inspec-
tion schemes, unloading and monitoring of landed catches and mar-
ket statistics. 35 The Agreement also provides for international 
cooperation in enforcement36 and obligation to prevent and settle dis-
putes by peaceful means.37 States Parties are required to encourage 
non-parties to become parties as well as to take measures to deter the 
activities of vessels flying the flag of non-parties which undermine 
the effective implementation of this Agreement. 38 State Parties are 
responsible and liable for damage or loss attributable to them in re-
gard to this Agreement.39 While non-parties are not bound by the 
provisions of this Agreement, they are liable to have the fishing ves-
sels flying their flag subjected to the rigorous regulation and imple-
mentation of fisheries management, and limitations and restrictions. 
National and international sanctions are also available.40 
33. Id., Article 18 (3)(a). 
34. Id., Article 18 (3)(b), and also to ensure compliance or non-violation of fishing 
regulations in areas under national jurisdiction of other States. In a different context, 
the case of the Virginius (1873) seems to point to the lack of relevancy whether the 
Virginius truly had the right to fly United States flag when it was carrying arms and 
ammunition and potential rebels destined for Cuba. The Virginius was captured by a 
Spanish man-of-war on the high seas. Among the 53 out of 155 crew members and 
passengers summarily condemned for piracy and executed, some were nationals of the 
US and the UK. Spain paid compensation for the families of the executed American 
and British nationals without the case being referred to arbitration. J. B. Moore's 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1906, Vol. 2, p. 895. 
35. Id., Article 18 (2)(d)(e)(f) and (g). 
36. For basic procedures for boarding and inspection, see id. Articles 21 and 22. 
37. Id., Part VIII Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Articles 27-32. 
38. !d., Part IX, Article 33. 
39. Id., Part XI, Article 35. 
40. Provisional measures may be and have been prescribed by the Law of the Sea 
Tribunal even prior to the preliminary determination of the jurisdictional issues by 
the Arbitration Tribunal under Annex VII seized of the matter. See, for instance, the 
Blue-fin Tuna Disputes between Australia and Japan; and New Zealand and Japan, 
ITLOS REPORT (2003). 
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D. Absence of Uniformity in the Requirements for Registration of 
Sea-Going Vessels 
In the absence of generally accepted criteria for registration of 
sea-going vessels so as to qualify them to fly the national flag of a 
State, let alone the existence of uniformity in the flagging of ships, 
States or flag States could hardly be found responsible or liable for 
non-compliance with their own national legislation. Besides, a State 
may at any time alter or waive certain conditions or requirements to 
enable it to reflag non-national ships and treat them as forming part 
of its own national fleet with every right to fly its flag 
A brief survey of national requirements of some selected mari-
time nations may suffice to demonstrate the variations and diversi-
ties of national requirements and regulations concerning registration 
of ships with license to fly their flag and with necessary legal 
implications. 
For convenience sake, it is practical in this survey41 to examine 
classification of ships by States under separate headings, according 
to the degree of strict requirements of a genuine link with the flag 
State or State of registration, starting from the most stringent re-
quirements of the United States to the least prerequisite of essential 
connection, such as Mexico and the States that permit flags of conve-
nience such as Liberia. 
1. The United States of America 
To qualify for registration in the United States, different require-
ments exist for different purposes of registration. 
a. Vessels registered in the United States for foreign trade 
may be any type, size and age and may have been con-
structed anywhere. However, they must be owned by a 
United States entity, but that entity may be owned up to one 
hundred percent in turn by non-citizen interest. 
b. Vessels registered in the United States for domestic trade 
must be built in the United States and owned by a U.S. en-
tity that is owned no less then 75% by U.S. citizens. 
c. Vessels registered in the United States must be inspected 
and certified by the U.S. Coast Guard. 
d. Vessels registered in the United States must be crewed by 
U.S. citizens. 
41. This survey is based on an APEC report of 14 February 2000. APEC is an 
association of Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, consisting of East and Southeast 
Asian nations, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Mexico, New Zealand as well as Tai-
wan and USA. The Association is loosely organized, with annual meetings at summit 
level, currently with headquarters in Singapore. 
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A number of significant amendments, modifications and excep-
tions have been introduced in the recent past to accommodate new 
situations, either for economic, political or strategic reasons. To give 
but a few illustrations: 
a. The United States reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers during 
the Iraq-Iran GulfWar of the 1980s is an example ofthe re-
laxation of U.S. registration requirements. The tanker need 
not be constructed in the United States but must satisfy in-
ternational standards of safety, not the United States re-
quirements. The reflagging was based on political and 
strategic motives as opposed to economic reasons.42 
b. The recent United States change of attitude towards 
coastal cruises has led to the relaxation of the requirements 
of United States construction for cruise vessels in response 
to the demand of the United States market for tourism as a 
coastal trade.43 It was possible for United States entities to 
operate foreign-built cruise ships of at least 20,000 gross 
tons with capacity of 800 passengers and less than ten year 
of age to fulfill the need to enlarge the domestic market 
which included visits to U.S. ports along U.S. coasts. This 
was subject to the proviso that the foreign-built cruise ves-
sels reflagged as United States vessels were to be gradually 
replaced by U.S. built cruise ships. In any event, they are to 
be inspected each year according to United States standards. 
They are also to be repaired in the United States and main-
tained by U.S. crew.44 This stop-gap legislation was based 
on economic grounds. Foreign-flagged vessels could operate 
in the coast-wise or domestic trade, two voyages per year, as 
long as the voyage did not last longer than two weeks, and 
either started at one coast of the United States and ended on 
the other, or started along one coast of the United States 
during a voyage between two countries. Also the Secretary 
could approve up to 30 foreign-flagged vessels to be 
chartered for 30 days to a non-cruise ship-owning company, 
to be used in domestic commerce. 
42. See supra section 3 (c) Reflagging of Private-owned Tankers, cited also in The 
Iranian Oil Platforms Case, ICJ REPORTS (2003). For a political comments on this 
judgment, see Pieter, H.F. Bekker, in 98 A.J.I.L. pp. 550-558. See also Mitra Koohi v. 
U.S.A.: Iran Air Flight 655 (3 July 1988, 290 victims) 976 F. 2 d. 1328. 
43. See US Cruise Vessel Act 2001, Report of the Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation, 197th Congress, 1st Session, 27 July 2001. Calendar No. 
106, 107th Congress Report Senate, 1st Session 107-47. 
44. Labor standards are regulated by International Labour Organization (ILO), 
while safety standards are implemented by delegation to Coast Guard approved clas-
sification societies to provide inspections to meet the safety standards set by the In-
ternational Maritime Organization (IMO). 
liliiiBm\ ~ 
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c. The latest United States requirements under the U.S. 
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) were signed 
into law by President George W. Bush in November 2002.45 
The new law was motivated by reasons of national security 
having regard to the 361 public ports that are operational 
through which pass each year approximately 95 per cent of 
United States overseas trade, including bulk and container-
ized cargo.46 The new legislation was designed to improve 
security conditions inter alia, to help identify and track ves-
sels, assess security preparedness and limit access to sensi-
tive areas. The Maritime Transportation Security Act 
established a new United States Antiterrorism Maritime 
Transportation System to develop an automatic identifica-
tion device that would enable port officials to determine the 
identity and position of vessels 'operating on the navigable 
waters of the United States.'4 7 
423 
All vessels within certain categories (based on the type and size) 
that enter United States ports must install such tracking equipment 
by no later than December 2004, although in several United States 
ports, the infrastructure for operating the system is not yet in 
place.48 In addition, owners and operators of vessels operating in 
United States waters, including foreign vessels, are required to sub-
mit for approval to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Se-
curity a 'Vessel Security Plan' for determining a 'transportation 
security incident' to the maximum extent practicable.49 Unless the 
plan is approved, the vessel may not operate in United States waters. 
The Secretary is also required to assess the effectiveness of anti-ter-
rorism measures maintained at foreign ports (such as screening of 
containerized cargo and restrictions on access to cargo) and to notify 
the foreign government if such measures were found ineffective as 
well as to recommend steps for improvements.50 
Pending such improvement, the Secretary 
a. may prescribe conditions of entry into the United States 
for any vessel arriving from that foreign port, or any vessel 
carrying cargo or passengers originating from or trans-
shipped through that port; 
45. See establishment of U.S. Antiterrorism Maritime Transportation System, Cir 
. 98 A.J.I.L. 588 (2004). 
46. 46 U.S.C.A. ss. 70101 (West 2004). 
47. !d., ss 70114. 
48. US General Accounting Office, Maritime Security Progress Made in Imple-
menting Maritime Transportation Security Act, GAO Doc. GA0-3-11551, at 7 (9 Sept. 
2003) available at http://www.gao.gov. 
49. 46 USCA SS 70103 (c) (1), (2), (3). 
50. Id. SS 70103 (c) (4), (5). 
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b. may deny entry to the United States to any vessel that 
does not meet such condition; and 
c. shall provide public notice for passengers of the ineffective 
antiterrorism measure. 
The Maritime Transportation Security Act also requires the De-
partment of Homeland Security to report to Congress on foreign-flag 
vessels calling at United States ports, particularly those with ques-
tionable ownership histories.51 The United States Coast Guard pub-
lished final regulations on maritime security implementation of the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act.52 Although foreign vessels 
from the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SO-
LAS) member States need not submit security plans to United States 
Government for approval, non-SOLAS foreign vessels are required to 
have Coast Guard-approved security plans.5 3 
2. Thailand 
Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (A.D. 1938)54 regulates registration 
of sea-going vessels in Thailand on the following criteria: 
a. Section 8 requires registration in accordance with type 
and size of ships 
(1) mechanically-propelled vessels of ten gross tons or 
more; 
(2) sea-going vessels, not mechanically propelled, of 
twenty gross tons or more; 
(3) river boats, not mechanically propelled, of fifty gross 
tons or more. 
b. For fishing in the sea 
( 1) mechanically propelled vessels of any size; 
(2) vessels, not mechanically propelled, of six gross tons 
or more. 
c. Ownership and 
d. Nationality of owner 
Section 7 specifies the need for ownership by Thai nationals. 
Section 7 bis reduces the required percentage from 70 to 50 
in case of a limited company and a public company limited 
51. MTSA 46 USCA s. 112. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) was 
also pursuing a similar initiative. The IMO decided to adopt new regulations to en-
hance ship and port security, especially from international terrorism. A new 'Interna-
tional Ship and Port Facility Security Code' (ISPS Code) was adopted, IMO Doc. 
SOLAS/CONF.5/32, Annex (12 Dec. 2002). Part A is mandatory, while Part B is rec-
ommended as guidance for implementation of the ISPS Code. 
52. 22 Oct. 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 60, 448, at 60, 459. 
53. The Coast Guard estimates the cost of implementation to be at US$ 1.5 billion 
for the first year at US$ 7.3 billion for the decade to come. 
54. Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (A.D. 1938), promulgated in Government Gazette 
B.E. 2481. cited from APEC Report 2000. 
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with capital and paid up capital 50 per cent owned by Thai 
nationals for a registered Thai vessel trading with foreign 
countries and not in Thai waters. 
e. Control 
Section 31 provides for the transfer of a registered Thai ves-
sel to a person qualified to own a Thai vessel under section 7 
within 90 days from the date of acquisition by unqualified 
person or from the date of disqualification of the original 
owner. 
f. Place of construction 
There is no restriction for a ship to be built in Thailand or 
anywhere else. 
g. Nationality of crew 
Ministerial Regulation No. 8 (1997) issued under the Thai 
Vessels Act B.E. 2481 requires at least half of the crew to be 
Thai nationals for a Thai-flagged vessel in international 
trade. This requirement may be reduced to 10 per cent of 
the crew with Thai nationality in case of inability of the 
ship-owner to hire Thai nationals. 
f. Certification 
Several types of certificate may be issued according to Ship 
Survey Regulation No. 23 (1986) for Coastal Trade and In-
terna-tional Trade. 
3. Hong Kong 
425 
A set of regulations has been introduced to improve registration 
procedures for Hong Kong shipping Register.55 The new Merchant 
Shipping Registration Amendment 2001 is part of Hong Kong's on-
going efforts to streamline ship registration procedures in Hong 
Kong. To proceed from one port to another, a ship must carry on 
board a certificate of registry issued by the flag administration. 
When a ship is reflagged, Hong Kong requires the original title docu-
ment to process a provisional ship registration. This period is re-
duced from three to one month. The tonnage charge has also been 
reduced correspondingly. This is part of the continuing efforts to en-
hance the attractiveness of the Hong Kong registry which now num-
bers some 581 vessels totaling 10.71 million gross tons. Otherwise, a 
Hong Kong ship must comply with safety requirements of the IMO, 
SOLAS, MARPOL, Load Line, STCW, etc. Ownership or representa-
tion by qualified persons is necessary, otherwise there are no limita-
tions on the type, size, age, control, nationality of crew, etc. 
55. Report from the Xinhua News Agency, (also www:marinelog.xorg/DOC/NEWS 
SMMIIMMID Feb 09.htm). 
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4. Taiwan 
Taiwan's Evergreen Maritime Co. announced on 4 February 
200256 that it would reflag more than half of its container vessels as 
British and Italian to facilitate its business with China. The purpose 
of Evergreen reflagging its ships is also to reduce optional costs, such 
as insurance cost, especially war-insurance risk. The war-insurance 
premiums for global sea and air transportation have increased 
sharply since the 9:11 Terrorist Attacks. As the United Kingdom is a 
traditional sea super power in marine insurance with Lloyds of 
London, Evergreen could reach an agreement on the insurance pre-
mium with the United Kingdom before changing the registration of 
its fleet. But the real purpose for this move is for Evergreen to ex-
pand its market. The recent purchase of an Italian shipping firm was 
a first step in entering the European market. Taiwan also had an eye 
on new cruise vessels to be constructed in Taronto City to develop 
cruise ships industry in the Mediterranean. 
Crew certificate requirements follow international practice such 
as STCW Convention. There is also maximum age allowable for im-
portation of existing ships into Taiwan. Taiwanese flags suffer the 
disadvantage of lacking a general or universal recognition, but the 
effective business management of its maritime fleet flagged or reflag-
ged clearly made up for its political handicaps. 57 
5. China 
To be registered in China, vessels must be owned by Chinese na-
tionals or companies. A ship forming part of a Sino-foreign joint ven-
ture must have at least fifty per cent of capital investment on the 
Chinese side. Chinese flagged vessels must be managed by Chinese 
nationals. Whenever it is necessary to recruit foreign sea-farers, 
their employment has to be approved by the competent authority of 
the transport and communication under the State Council. But there 
is no restriction on the type, size and construction of the ship. 58 
6. Singapore 
To give effect to the Hague-Visby Rules, Singapore amended its 
1995 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) in 1997.59 The legisla-
56. Report by Yang Chang-Cheng, Associate Professor at the Dept of Shipping 
and Transportation Management at the China College of Marine Technology and 
Commerce. 
57. There has been no need for Taiwan to change the registration of its EVA air 
fleet, nor China Airline for that matter. 
58. See the APEC report 2000, cited in note 54 above. See also Order of the Presi-
dent of the People's Republic of China No. 28, promulgated on 25 Dec. 1999, entered 
into force on 1 July 2000: Maritime Procedure Law of the Peoples' Republic of China. 
59. Id., see in particular, the decision of Singapore Court of Appeal in Sunlight 
Mercantile Pte, Ltd. v. Ever Lucky Shiping Co., Ltd. [2004] 1 SLR 171, holding that a 
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tive technique was modeled after the United Kingdom 1924 Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act which gave effect to the Hague Rules. The 
amendment was meant to fill one lacuna in cases where the contract 
of carriage albeit governed by Singapore law would not attract the 
mandatory application of the Hague-Visby Rules, such as the port of 
shipment being non-Singapore. 
Only Singapore citizens or permanent residents or companies in-
corporated in Singapore can be registered owner of Singapore ships. 
A company registered in Singapore with one hundred percent foreign 
shareholders can register a Singapore ship. The size required is at 
least 1,600 gross tons and self-propelled. 
The vessel may be surveyed by the survey or by any of the classi-
fication societies authorized by the Maritime Port Authority. Owners 
of ships above seventeen years are required to submit a special report 
on the condition of the ship issued by one of the authorized classifica-
tion societies. 
7. Japan 
Japanese vessels are defined as ships which have been granted 
the right to fly the Japanese flag,60 including 
a. Ships owned by the Government of Japan or a Japanese 
Public Office; 
b. Ships owned by Japanese nationals; and 
c. Ships owned by a legal entity with principal office located 
in Japan, and all of their representatives are Japanese na-
tionals. This may be subject to additional qualification that 
more than two thirds of their representatives must be J apa-
nese nationals. There are no other requirements or 
restrictions. 
8. Korea 
Any vessels over 20 gross tons can be registered as a Korean ves-
sel under Korean Vessel Registration Act.61 Foreign-owned company 
registered in Korea under relevant laws of the Republic of Korea may 
operate a Korean flagged vessel. The majority of the investors must 
be Korean and three fifths of the voting rights of the directors must 
belong to Korean. The directors representing the company must be a 
Korean national. The ownership requirement is being revised, so as 
clause in Bills of Lading excluding liability of ship-owner for any loss or damage ''how-
soever" caused or arising was not sufficient to exonerate it, where the general average 
incident was caused by unseaworthiness. York-Antwerp Rules 1974. 
60. I d., see also Article 3 of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 
(MLIT) Establishment Law, 2001, setting out MLIT Bureau Activities. 
61. Id. 
.• 
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to allow a Korean registered commercial company to own a Korean 
vessel without limitation as to nationality of shareholders or co-
owners. 
9. Mexico 
There are no restrictions on vessels registration. Only vessels 
with Mexican flag must have Mexican crew.62 All vessels are re-
quired to comply with international conventions. 
10. Indonesia 
A vessel of 7 gross tons or more may be registered in Indonesia 
and allowed to fly Indonesian flag. It has to be owned by Indonesian 
citizens or companies incorporated in Indonesia.63 
11. Philippines 
The Philippines requires all entities wishing to engage in over-
seas shipping, specially ship owning and ship chartering must be reg-
istered and accredited with the MARINA.64 Only Philippines 
national entity may be so accredited (60 - 40 per cent Philippine -
foreign equity.) Chartered ships may be registered under Philippines 
flag (a) with at least 60 - 40 Philippine equity participation; (b) 
with 100 per cent Philippine crew; and (d) with complete compliance 
with IMO Safety and Marine Pollution Prevention Conventions.65 
12. Liberia (Flag of convenience) 
For vessels owned by a Liberian company, existing owners who 
wish to reflag will have to redomicile the owning company to another 
company or transfer ownership to a non-Liberian company's place of 
incorporation. Not all countries allows redomiciliation, Hong Kong 
and Singapore do not allow it. A Liberian company could redomicile 
to Panama, (another flag of convenience), Marshall Islands, British 
Virgin Islands or Bermuda.66 
Another issue relates to the mortgage or remortgage of a ship to 
the owner's bank. A Liberian mortgage cannot automatically be reg-
istered elsewhere without amendment. 
Moreover, the owner may have to obtain charterer's consent to 
changing flag and sufficient time should be allowed to obtain this 
consent and agreement on the new registry for the vessel. In addi-
tion, the owner may need new trading certificates from a classifica-
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. See Memorandum Circular Nos. 330-A and 42-A. 
65. See Presidential Decree 866, Amending PD 760. Other international instru-
ments include the 1978 STCW Convention, as amended and the I.S.A. Code. 
66. See APEC Report 2000, cited in note 54 above. 
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tion society approved by the new flag State. The insurance will have 
to be notified of the transfer. Officers and crew may also require li-
censes from the new flag State. These items will doubtless incur 
costs. 
E. APEC Concerns for Ships Engaged in International Voyages 
Having regard to the casualties suffered by United States vessels 
of various types, it is not surprising that the United States authori-
ties have been most vigilant to safeguard freedom of navigation and 
to secure safe passage for international maritime transport. This 
concern is shared by most sea-faring nations on a world-wide or 
global basis67 as well as at inter-regional, multi-regional, regional 
and sub-regional levels. 
The current study is singling out one multi-regional model, 
APEC, as a tri-regional association of East and Southeast Asian na-
tions together with Australia and New Zealand and the Pacific na-
tions, including the United States of America, North and South 
American States bordering the Eastern Pacific Ocean, including Ca-
nada, Mexico, Chile and Peru. 
APEC plans to protect ships engaged in international voyages by 
promoting ship and port security plans and installation of automatic 
identification systems by the end of 2004. Enhancing cooperation on 
fighting piracy in the region within APEC fora and organizations 
such as the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre 
and International Maritime Organization will be next on the agenda 
of measures to protect ships on international voyages. 
APEC members have been cooperating to strengthen border se-
curity through enhanced supply chain of security guidelines. These 
non-binding guidelines are business friendly and are being used by 
the private sector to reinforce their supply chain security practices. 
The APEC Transportation Working Group is also developing stan-
dards for detection equipment and other security technology. The Ac-
creditation of Seafarer Manning Agencies in the APEC tri-regional 
project plans to devise a system for accrediting manning agents to 
provide secure employees to maritime companies in the Asia-Pacific 
Region. The APEC Transportation Work Group is also supporting 
the development and use oflntelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), 
involving the use of electronic cargo seals and sensors, increased effi-
ciency in inspecting seals, the use of electronic cargo manifests and 
Global Navigational Satellite Systems. 
67. On the global scale, a new 'International Ship and Port Facility Security Code' 
(ISPS Code), IMO. Doc. SOLAS/CONF.5/34, Annex 1 (12 Dec. 2002). IMO will pub-
lish a 'White List' of vessels issued an 'International Ship Security Certificate' (ISSC) 
by authorized shipping societies. 
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To implement Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) initia-
tive, APEC leaders agreed to secure and enhance the flow of goods 
and people through measures to protect cargo, ships, international 
aviation68 and people in transit. 
STAR I 
The first Secure Trade for APEC Region (STAR) Conference was 
held in Bangkok on 23-25 February 2003, co-hosted by Thailand and 
the United States with 21 APEC Members in attendance and partici-
pating as well as officials from international organizations such as 
the IMO, IATA,69 World Custom Organization (WCO) and the world 
Bank, not to mention senior executives from major private sector 
companies affected to discuss how to advance trade efficiency and 
trade security in the Asia-Pacific Region. Participants agreed that 
investment in security can deliver significant economic returns, by 
reducing the economic costs of terrorism prevention and by facilitat-
ing freer movement of goods and people. 
As a follow-up to STAR I initiative, Thailand and the United 
States developed a demonstration project, the STAR-Bangkok/Laem 
Chabang Efficient and Secure Trade (BEST) Port, using e-seal tech-
nology to track shipments of secured containers via satellite from the 
Port of Laem Chabang to the Port of Seattle. 
This constituted a show of solidarity in collective responsibility 
to enhance the confidence of exporters and consumers in the security 
of the region's supply chain. 
STAR II 
Chile hosted the second STAR Conference from 4-6 March 2004. 
The agenda covered topics of maritime security, air transportation 
security,70 the mobility of people and measures to prevent terrorist 
financing. APEC members agreed to implement new security mea-
sures to ensure more stable economic environment through effective 
collective collaboration between public and private sectors and shar-
ing of information and responsibility between APEC Governments. 
There were some concerns nonetheless regarding the impact that se-
curity measures could have on trade facilitation. A global approach is 
vital and that the tri-regional initiative should be globalized. 
It was agreed that APEC economies need to have an operational 
financial intelligence unit to prevent terrorist financing and to 
counter money laundering for terrorist financing. 
68. For international aviation, see the section on Air Law below. 
69. International Air Transport Association. This is vital for international civil 
aviation. 
70. See further detailed discussion in the ensuing section below. 
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F. Conclusion 
This study may serve to demonstrate the lack of uniformity in 
the various national legal systems regarding the requirements for a 
State to register a vessel under its flag. The test of the closest link or 
connection need not depend on the place of construction or qualified 
percentage of ownership by nationals, or of the equity in an owning 
entity. What appears to be decisive is the willingness of the State to 
consider a sea-worthy vessel qualified to fly its flag, and hence wor-
thy of its protection. The flag State or State of registration carries 
with it the authority to apply and enforce its law. On the other hand, 
it equally entails the liability and responsibility of protection, which 
today has become a matter of common concern not only for individual 
responsibility of each flag State but for the collective and shared re-
sponsibility of the maritime trading nations and the entire global 
community ideally to police if not patrol the oceans. 
Any serious study of comparative legal systems on the issues 
under review will have to bear in mind the ultimate common interest 
of mankind in the safety of life at sea and in the free and secure 
movement of goods and people across the oceans, not unmindful of 
the ever constant state of evolution in which the applicable rule of 
international law on any controversial issue is finding itself. 
III. AIR LAW 
A. General Observations 
For Present purposes, AIR LAW means international civil and 
commercial aviation law, otherwise known as Air Transport Law, 
and not the quality of the air as in international environmental law. 
The present study of Air Law provides a more or less exact counter-
part parallel to Maritime Law in the preceding section. While no at-
tempt will be made to relate or restate the evolution of civil aviation 
law based on legal developments of Maritime Law, the current in-
quiry is confined to a very few points of special interest from compar-
ative law perspective. To an appreciable extent, efforts will be made 
to underline a potential and likely reproduction of a parallel evolu-
tion of maritime rules in international air transport law, as reflected 
in the adoption of corresponding rules in aviation law or domestic air 
transport law of national legal systems. 
In historical perspective, legal development in domestic and in-
ternational air transport has not always followed the exact path of 
legal development in maritime law. The high seas or open seas were 
relatively free, and indeed most international sea ports have always 
been open to ships of all flags for international trade. The highways 
of the skies were known to be comparatively unfree, due in no small 
measure to the exclusive domain of territorial airspace. Each of the 
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traffic rights, from the third to the sixth freedoms, had to be negoti-
ated and bilateral agreements successfully reached to initiate the op-
eration of international air services. Multilateral Conventions, such 
as the Chicago Convention 194471 was inadequate to ensure free 
movement of passengers and goods by air. Except for the right of 
over-flight and the right to land and refuel (fist and second freedoms), 
no traffic rights were automatically accorded. The United States pol-
icy of 'open skies' for international aviation was only an American 
dream in the 1940s. 
In recent years, renewed efforts have been launched to initiate 
bilateral air-services arrangements on a revised model of 'open skies' 
or 'mixed open skies package'. Recent attempts have met with some 
measure of success, notably the agreements between the United 
States and Canada, and with the United Kingdom and a number of 
European NATO partners of the United States. This has not escaped 
the watchful eye of the European Community. The European Com-
mission raised the question with the European Court of Justice in the 
series of cases in 1998,72 involving inter alia, the question of the need 
for the Community to renegotiate a new 'mixed open skies package' 
Air Service Agreements with the United States to replace the ex-
isting eight bilateral agreements concluded by the United Kingdom 
and several other Community members. For the Community, the in-
tra-Community routes had been reserved almost as 'Cabotage' for 
Community national carriers. Special provisions will have to be 
made on the analogy of the provisional stop-gap adopted by the 
United States Administration in connection with the reflagging of 
foreign-built cruise vessels to operate in coastwise and domestic trade 
off the United States coasts. 73 
B. Similarities and Dissimilarities in Legal Development 
To proceed from a study of the law of maritime transport to that 
of civil air transport, some similarities deserve the closest attention, 
having regard to the dissimilarities in the conditions and capacities 
of maritime and air transport. 
71. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 Dec. 1944, T.I.A.S. 
1951; 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
72. See Commission u. U.K, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Luxemburg, 
Austria and Germany, E.C.J. 5 Nov. 2002, cases C-466/98-469/98; C-471/98-474/98; 
C-475/98-476/98; 2002 E.C.J. I-9427. The Council has authorized the Commission to 
renegotiate a series of mixed open-skies Agreements with the United States, New 
Zealand and Singapore to correct the respective bilateral Air Services Agreements on 
the basis of the horizontal mandate. See EC Regulation 847/2004 of European Parlia-
ment and the Council of 29 April 2004. 
73. See the US Cruise Vessel Act, 2001, cited in note 43 above. 
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1. Piracy Jure Gentium and Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft in 
Flight 
For one thing, the perils of the seas and the bottomless oceans 
are not dissimilar from the hazards of the skies. Piracy became the 
first known offense against the law of nations, recognized as such in 
most penal codes as well as in customary international law. The clas-
sic definition of piracy jure gentium embracing the existence of a pi-
rate ship to capture a victim ship may seem outmoded. Nonetheless, 
the treatment of pirates as hastes generis humani (enemies of man-
kind) appears to have retained its raison d'etre today as much as ever 
before when it was originally introduced. The transplantation of the 
concept of 'piracy' into international air law would seem unreal, if not 
incomplete. There is no need for a 'pirate aircraft' to capture and 
board a 'victim aircraft' in mid-air in mid-flight. Development in in-
ternational aviation law has been in the limitation of liabilities of air 
carriers as foreshadowed in the original Warsaw Convention 1929.74 
Offenses on board an aircraft had not attracted much attention until 
the Tokyo Convention of 1963.75 The problem of hijacking of aircraft 
came to a head in the Hague Convention on the Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft in Flight 1970.76 
2. Terror on the High Seas and in the Skies 
The maritime incident of the Achille Lauro77 in the Mediterra-
nean in the mid-eighties involving unlawful seizure of an Italian 
cruise vessel by terrorists who boarded the ship as passengers in a 
North Mrican Mediterranean port could scarcely be characterized as 
'piracy' for want of another ship known as a pirate ship or even an 
aircraft. The horror that befell the Achille Lauro resulted in one 
American ex-serviceman killed by being thrown overboard. Subse-
quently, the United States took occasion to intercept an Egypt Air 
flight carrying some of the alleged terrorists involved in the incident 
and caused them to be landed in a military airfield in Sicily.78 While 
the United States request for extradition was not favorably received 
by the Italian authorities who resorted to the option aut dedere aut 
7 4. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Car-
riage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Dec. 1929, copy available at www.lexmer-
catoria.org, Hague Protocol, 28 Sept. 1955, ICAO Doc. 7632, and protocol No. 4 
Montreal, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9148. Compare the UN Convention on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea, 1978, Hamburg. 
75. 14 Sept 1963; 20 U.S.T. 2941; 704 .U.N.T.S. 219 (Tokyo Convention). 
76. 16 Dec. 1970; 20 U.S.T. 1641; 10 I.L.M. 113 (Hague Convention). 
77. The Achille Lauro was an Italian cruise vessel, flying Italian flag, with an 
Italian crew, but with passengers from the Mediterranean ports. Compare also the 
destruction of the Rainbow Warrior. 
78. US fighters, based on Israeli intelligence, intercepted an Egypt Air flight over 
the Mediterranean and escorted it to land at the military facilities near Palermo in 
Sicily. 
•. 
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judicare, by prosecuting some and releasing others.79 This incident 
seems pertinent to the current comparative study as it also relates to 
maritime as well as air transport law, as it relates to sea-jacking af-
ter lawful boarding and also to air interception. The lesson from the 
Achille Lauro Incident could lead to a review of the traditional con-
cept of piracy to include unlawful seizure of ship in voyage in addition 
to the seizure of aircraft in flight. Legal developments have taken a 
long stride from the mid-eighties to prepare a proper procedure to 
prevent 'terror in the skies' as 'on the high seas.' 
Clearly, there have been innumerable instances of 'terror in the 
skies' involving United States commercial airlines. The international 
communities responded with the adoption of a series of International 
Conventions. 80 
3. Quarantine or Maritime Interdiction and Aerial 
Interception to Prevent Impending Armed Attacks 
by Weapons of Destruction 
It is noteworthy that in a very limited area of maritime and air 
law, in the context of an extended notion of self-defense, individual 
and collective, the United States position may have been far ahead of 
other nations. 
The incidents of September 11, 2001 certainly opened up new 
frontiers for legal development in international air and maritime law. 
It should be recalled that President John F. Kennedy in 196281 initi-
ated fresh developments in the law of 'Quarantine' or 'interdiction 
Line' aiming to put a stop to the shipment of materiel de guerre to 
that 'imprisoned island.' That initiative produced the salutary result 
of modifying the existing rules of ocean law. 
A new rule of international law was born overnight, not without 
a sacrifice.82 The same could be said of President George W. Bush's 
innovation in announcing the United States intention to shoot down 
any aircraft (with or without US registration) which has been unlaw-
fully seized and converted into a weapon of destruction against 
targets in the United States. This declaration of intent was a bold 
step taken not lightly but with mature deliberation by the Bush Ad-
79. The US extradition request predated the Anti-Terrorism Act 1986. It was not 
explicitly based on the passive nationality principle. 
80. In addition to the Tokyo Convention (1963) and the Hague Convention (1970) 
cited in Notes 75 and 76 above, the Montreal Convention (1971) should be listed: Con-
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 23 
Sept. 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (The Montreal Sabotage Convention). 
81. This interdiction was proclaimed as 'Quarantine' and explained to the UN Se-
curity Council as and when events were taking place in 1962. See Abram Chayes, 
Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1963, at 550-554. 
82. The opening of the first hot line communication between President Kennedy 
and Chairman Krushev succeeded in establishing a cooling off period and mutual 
agreement to dismantle missiles sites in Cuba and in Turkey. 
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ministration, having regard to the prevailing contrary rule of inter-
national air law,83 and against the background of Article 3 bis (a) of 
the Protocol of 10 May 1984. 
4. Shared Responsibility for Policing the High Seas and Air 
Space 
The preceding contribution of the United States has left an indel-
ible mark in the making of rules of international law in the field of 
maritime and air transport. 
Indeed, new pertinent rules are being made by operation of 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which in May 200384 comprises 
fifteen nations : Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, 
Spain the United Kingdom and the United States. These countries 
have agreed not to traffic in missiles and WMD themselves and also 
to adopt measures to cooperate in the search and seizure of suspect 
vessels flying the flags of participating States and searching of for-
eign vessels entering their ports, denying transit rights to suspect 
aircraft, and requiring such plane that enter to land for inspection. 
Besides Denmark and Turkey, sixty other nations have intimated 
their agreement to cooperate on an ad hoc basis, if such a suspect 
vessel or aircraft enters their territorial waters or airspace. 85 
Thus far, 'operational experts' have held several meetings, most 
recently in Washington and Ottawa. They have agreed to exchange 
information concerning suspected proliferation of WMD, to review 
and strengthen their national laws, and to undertake a number of 
interdiction measures.8 6 
83. President Bush made this declaration as Commander-in-Chief of the United 
States. See Richard Gardner, Neither Bush nor the Jurisprudence, 97 A.J.I.L. 585, 
587 (2003). See also ICAO Declaration on Misuse of Civil Aircraft as Weapons of De-
struction and other Terrorist Acts involving Civil Aviation, 5 Oct. 2001, 411.L.M. 501 
(2002). 
84. See Michael Byes, Policing the High Seas: the Proliferation Security Initiative, 
in 98 A.J.I.L. 526, 528 (2004). US and Liberia agreed to accord each other the right, 
on the high seas, to board, search, detain, and seize cargo of any vessel reasonably 
suspected of trafficking in missiles or WMD, 11 Feb. 2004, available at http://www. 
state.gov/t/np/trty/32403.htm. 
85. In December 2002, Spanish Marines boarded the So San, a North Korean 
freighter crossing the Arabian Sea with hidden fifteen Scud missiles, purchased by 
Yemen. In September 2003, a German-owned freighter, the BBC China was heading 
for Libya laden with thousands of centrifuges that could be used to enrich Uranium. 
The cargo was seized and somehow Libya was persuaded to abandon its WMD 
programs. 
86. See Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, 4 
Sept. 2003, State Dept. See also Israeli practice concerning high seas interdiction of 
weapon-laden vessels, most notably the January 2002 seizure of the Karin A, an 
Iraqi-flagged ship in the Red Sea with some fifty tons of Iranian weaponry, including 
Katyusha rockets, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. 
'• 
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5. APEC Continuing Concerns for Air Transport Security 
APEC has shown deep concerns for the safety of ships in interna-
tional voyages, 87 in the same way APEC STAR initiative in enhanc-
ing the safety and security of airline passengers and crew. APEC 
members have agreed to introduce highly effective screening proce-
dures and equipment at all APEC international airports within this 
year 2005.88 Programs are designed to assist members to meet inter-
national safety standards and to ensure that aviation personnel re-
ceive proper training with the necessary resources to carry out their 
responsibilities. 
APEC group on air transportation welcomed the measures im-
plemented by airlines to protect passengers, personnel and passen-
gers' belongings, air transport being a major component of trade and 
development in the Asian Pacific region. Further measures are 
needed to deliver an effective approach to air transport security in 
the APEC region. These should include the training of the personnel 
to monitor suspicious activities and report incidents, cargo security 
programs to ensure the legitimacy of shippers, in cargo data valida-
tion systems, and identification of high risk cargo by means of effec-
tive canine detection services, enhanced risk assessment 
methodologies and the use of air marshals to prevent international 
terrorism. 
Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANP ADS) continue to be a 
genuine asset to international commercial aviation. Strict controls 
on the export and transfer of missiles and timely exchange of infor-
mation among APEC members on MANP ADS threats could provide 
the most effective measures to prevent possible missiles attacks. 
C. Liability and Responsibility of the State of Registration 
From the United States vantage point, an armed attack against 
an American aircraft, civil or military, is no different from an armed 
attack against an American-flagged vessel, merchantman or men-of-
war alike. It is considered to be an attack against the United States 
itself, which may induce or provoke responsive measures of self-de-
fense. The present study is designed to illustrate the precise extent 
of liability and responsibility of the State of registration of aircraft of 
any type. 
The relevance of a warranty of airworthiness is more apparent 
than real. A certificate of sea-worthiness of a sea-going vessel may 
serve a meaningful purpose. But an aircraft has a shorter life span 
depending on the length and frequency of its service. The at-
87. See the preceding Section above in ss. 5 APEC Concerns for the Safety of 
Ships Engaged in International Voyages. 
88. For instance, the new Thai Airport Suvarnabhumi, is currently being fitted 
with 26 units of the latest model of the screening detector equipment. 
2006] LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF REGISTRATION 437 
tributability to the State of registration for any inspection or survey 
of an aircraft or a ship for the purpose of issuance of a certificate of 
'seaworthiness' or 'airworthiness' is of limited relevancy in cases 
where it would engage the liability of the 'classification societies' or 
'aeronautics board or committee', which liability is in turn imputed or 
attributed to the State of registration or the flag State, as the case 
may be. 
What is by far of greater practical interest and pertinence ap-
pears to be the liability and responsibility of the State of registration 
for the activities or conduct of the aircraft. 
Failure on the part of the State to enact effective law to control 
aircraft registered in the State may engage State responsibility. No 
vicarious liability is directly attached to the State of registration, the 
owner and/or operator of the aircraft is liable for the loss incurred. 
In most cases, for civil and commercial air transport, a carrier is 
answerable for taking an insurance against the risk of aerial acci-
dent. Passengers and cargo-owners could also take additional insur-
ance, while the insurance companies in turn may take further 
reinsurances. Thus, the State of registration is rarely found prima-
rily liable or responsible for any loss resulting from misconduct or 
willful conduct of the cockpit crew. Product liability may be attribu-
table to the manufacturer of the defective parts accountable for the 
mishap. The main concern of the State of registration is confined to 
the duty of protection and safety of aircraft under its national regis-
tration. This includes precautionary measures to prevent acts of ter-
rorism against the aircraft, the responsibility primarily resting on 
the State of registration but is also shared by all members of the 
global community to ensure to safety and security of air transport in 
no way dissimilar from the efforts displayed by flag States for safety 
of life at sea (SOLAS). 
In contrast to the liabilities of carriers which are limited by the 
Warsaw system now undergoing some review, the United States is 
not seeking to limit its responsibility to take all measures necessary 
to prevent an armed attack by flying object. 89 
D. Conclusion 
Air transport requires as much vigilance if not indeed more so-
phisticated mechanisms than what is expected in maritime trans-
port, not only against acts of terror and attacks or explosion and total 
destruction of the aircraft, but also as recent events reveal the need 
to take preventive measures against possible conversion of unlaw-
89. Compare the limitation of liabilities of carriers in Maritime Transport under 
various rules, such as Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg (1978). The United States 
is prepared to extend the responsibility of the flag State in the context of its duty to 
cooperate with other flag States to suppress acts of terrorism on the high seas. 
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fully seized aircraft into a weapon of destruction, complete with the 
fuel on its way to hit designated targets on the ground or tall build-
ings in mid air. The risk of terrorist attack not only against an air-
craft in flight itself, but also by the use of unlawfully seized aircraft 
as means of delivery of a weapon of destruction against pre-selected 
targets on the surface. All States are expected to contribute their in-
dividual and collective efforts to preempt the recurrence of the events 
of 9:11. This is a truly collective responsibility to be shared by all. 
Each State is in turn a State of registration without being itself a 
maker or builder of any aircraft. 
IV. OuTER SPACE LAw 
A. General Notions 
Space law or international law governing the peaceful use of 
outer space can in some way be regarded as an outstretch of interna-
tional aviation law or an extension of air law. Aeronautically, how-
ever, flight in outer space is not winged flight for lack of air support. 
Thus, the law of outer space owes its origin to the start of the flight 
into space, which has to begin from surface through territorial air 
space very often of more than one jurisdiction around the globe before 
a satellite or a space object reaches its orbital level of altitude. An-
other confusing yardstick in the assessment of the speed or velocity of 
a space vehicle and the distance or altitude to attain may further 
compound the confusion by the use or double use of mileage, namely, 
surface mile and nautical mile, and the use of the metric system as 
the more regular method of measuring the distance in outer space. 
This inevitable confusion may result in miscalculations of the exact 
distance to a given destination in outer space, and may actually cause 
some tragic accidents, over-shooting of the target or other shortcom-
ings. One last notion to be mentioned is the absence of a clear-cut 
dividing line between air space and outer space, which may be only 
be roughly calculated from the lowest orbit or perigee of about 110 
kilometers above ground surface. This imprecise border line necessa-
rily serves to blend the application of air law with outer space law, 
using common overlapping principles as a space vehicle travels 
through the upper limits of territorial air space or traversing the 
space barriers. 9 0 
90. See SoMPONG SucHARITKUL, THE BENEFITS oF SPACE AcTIVITIEs FOR AsiAN 
CouNTRIES (1992), Golden Gate University; Reprint from the proceedings: "The High-
ways of Air Space and Outer Space over Asia," International Institute of Air and 
Space Law, Leiden University, (Pablo Mendes de Leon ed., 1992). See also Kosmo, 
The Commercialization of Space: A Regulatory Scheme that Promotes Commercial 
Space Ventures and International Responsibilities, 61 SouTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW RE-
VIEW, 1059 (1988); C. Christol, The 1986 Remote Sensing Principles: Emerging or Ex-
isting Law? PRocEEDINGS OF THE 13TH CoLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OuTER SPACE 289 
(1987). 
l 
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In this context, the 'open skies' policy as applied to outer space 
law has become a living reality, thanks to the penetrating vision of 
countless viewing satellites orbiting the earth. 
B. Collective Efforts to Regulate the Exploration and Peaceful Use 
of Outer Space 
The time has come for effective international control mecha-
nisms to be put in place to regulate the exploration and peaceful use 
of outer space. 91 These are included in a series of declarations of 
principles adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
beginning from 1962 with The Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,92 the Principles 
Governing the Use by States of Artificial Satellites for International 
Direct Broadcasting (1982),93 the Principles Relating to Remote 
Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (1986),94 the Principles Rele-
vant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (1992),95 
and the Declaration on International Cooperation on the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All 
States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing 
Countries (1996).96 
The corpus juris governing outer space is embodied in another 
series of United Nations Treaties, beginning with the Outer Space 
Treaties (1967),97 the Agreement on the Rescue and Return of Astro-
nauts and Space Objects (1968),98 and ending up with the Moon 
Treaty (1979).99 The crux of the substantive law pertaining to the 
liability and responsibility of the State of registration under review 
can be found in two successive Conventions, namely, the Convention 
on Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1971)100 and the 
91. See U.N. Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, a commemorative edition 
published on the occasion of the Third U.N. Conference on the Exploration and Peace-
ful Use of Outer Space (UNISPACE III) A/AC.1051722, A/CONF. 184. 
92. G.A. Res. 1962 (1963). 
93. G.A. Res. 37/92 (1982). 
94. G.A. Res. 41/165 (1986). 
95. G.A. Res. 47/68 (1992). 
96. G.A. Res. 51/122 (1996). 
97. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. G.A. Res. 
2222 (XXI) Annex, adopted on 19 Dec, 1966, opened for signature on 27 Jan. 1967 and 
entered into force on 10 Oct. 1967, 
98. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII) Annex, 
adopted on 19 Dec, 1967, opened for signature on 22 April1968 and entered into force 
on 3 Dec. 1968. 
99. The Agreement Governing the Activities of the States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68 Annex, adopted on 5 Dec. 1979, opened for signature 
on 18 Dec. 1979 and entered into force on 11 July 1984. 
100. The Liability Convention, G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI) Annex, adopted on 29 Dec, 
1971, opened for signature on 29 Mar. 1972 and entered into force on 1 Sept. 1972. 
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Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(1974). 101 Although chronologically the Registration Convention 
should have preceded the Liability Convention, but once the Liability 
Convention was adopted, the impelling need for registration became 
apparent. 
C. Liability and Responsibility of the State of Registration 
For space objects, more than for vessels and aircraft, the liability 
of national registry agencies is indubitably imputable if not readily 
attributed to the State of registration. The State stands liable for 
whatever harm, injury or loss caused by any registered objects 
launched into space. The law of outer space has developed a more 
sophisticated set of criteria to determine multiple liabilities which 
are based on joint and several responsibilities of every State con-
nected with the launching process of a space object, most certain of 
all the State of Registration. The 'space object' includes artificial 
satellites, space stations, as well as space and launch vehicles. 
1. The 'State of Registration' and the 'Launching State' 
Simple enough, a 'State of Registration' may be defined as the 
State that registers the space object in question. However, further 
inquiry has to be made as to the duty to register, or rather which of 
the States among the launching States should bear the responsibility 
of registering an object launched into outer space. Article II (2) ofthe 
Registration Convention provides a clue to the solution to this 
enigma. 
"(2) Where there are two or more States in respect of any 
such space object, they shall jointly determine which one of 
them shall register the object in accordance with paragraph 
1 of this Article, bearing in mine the provisions of Article 
VIII of the Outer Space Treaty) and without prejudice to ap-
propriate agreements concluded among the launching States 
on jurisdiction and control over the space object and over any 
personnel thereof."l02 
In this context, it should be noted that the term 'space object' 
includes component parts of a space object as well as the launch vehi-
cle in accordance with Article II.103 The multiple choice to be made 
101. The Registration Convention, G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX) Annex, adopted on 12 
Nov. 1974, opened for signature on 14 Jan. 1975 and entered into force on 15 Sept. 
1976. 
102. See Article II (1) and (2) of the Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, cited in note 126 above. 
103. Id., Article I (b) definition of a space object. 
I 
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for the State of registration is dictated by the plurality of the mean-
ings of the term 'launching State', which includes under Article I (a) 
a. A State which launches or procures the launching of a space 
object; and 
b. A State from whose territory or facility a space object is 
launched. 104 
This does not preclude the launching of a space object by an in-
ternational organization, such as the United Nations or a regional 
organization such as the European Space Agency (ESA). The com-
plexity of this multiplicity of launchers and international legal per-
sonalities responsible for registration may thereby be further 
compounded. Supplementary agreements between launching States 
and/or launching institutions may help clarify the respective rights 
and obligations as well as joint and several liabilities of the various 
partners in the common or joint venture. In the ultimate analysis, it 
is the collective will of the launching States that determines the pre-
cise nature and contents as well as the extent of the rights and obli-
gations of each individual partner in the launching of the space 
object. 
2. Multiple Standards of Liability of the Launching States 
Apart from the multiplicity and joint or several liabilities of the 
launching States, although only one of which serves as the State of 
registration, the outer space regime has to work out a practical solu-
tion for the apportionment of liabilities in terms of proportionality of 
faults or risks or in terms of priority of claims by the injured parties, 
and the respective primary or residual responsibility of the launching 
partners. Thus far, the provisions of the Liability Convention appear 
to suggest a solution of joint and several liabilities with possible ap-
portionment of the compensation to be paid with possible eventual 
recovery from other partners. 
The outer space regime provides two types of liability for the 
launching States, individual and collective, joint and several. In the 
first place, the launching States are liable absolutely, i.e., without 
proof of fault for the damage caused by their space object to the sur-
face of the Earth or to aircraft in flight. 105 Article II of the Liability 
Convention provides for 'absolute liability' for damage caused (1) to 
the surface of the Earth; and (2) to the aircraft in flight within the 
Earth air space. 
Article III of the Liability Convention provides for 'liability based 
on fault' in the event of damage caused elsewhere than on the surface 
of the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or 
104. Id., Article I (a) definition of a launching State. Compare Article I (c) of the 
Liability Convention (1972) cited in note 100 above. 
105. See Liability Convention cited in note 100 above. 
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property on board such a space object by a space object of another 
launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to 
the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.l06 
Article IV provides for joint and several liabilities of the first two 
States for damage caused to a third State or to its natural or juridical 
persons, absolute liability for damage on the surface of the Earth or 
to aircraft in flight and liability based on fault for damage to a space 
object elsewhere than on Earth.l07 
V. A CLOSING NoTE 
The preceding survey of the comparative study of the practice of 
States on the Liability and Responsibility of the State of Registration 
or Flag State in cases respectively of vessels, aircraft and spacecraft I 
does not appear to be final and conclusive. Each regime seems to be 
in a state of flux or more exactly in a state of evolutionary transfor- 1 
mation in search for a more comprehensive set of rules regarding lia-
bility of the State of registry for various purposes, absolute liability 1 
as well as fault-based liability for sea-going vessels, for airlines and 
for space objects. Flagged States or States of registration are willing 1 
to accept the responsibility not so much for the loss or injury caused 
by their ships, airplanes or spacecraft under national flag or registra- 1 
tion but more so for the obligation to protect the flag and registry of 
the fleet, especially the enhancement of freedom from terrorist attack 1 
and the new-found shared or collective responsibility of users of inter-
national highways to preserve and defend the security interest of in- I 
ternational waterways, international air routes and space odysseys 
in geostationary or rotational orbits. I 
The concept of collective or shared responsibility has grown out 
of the duty of cooperation among States and has its counterpart in 
the notion of shared resources and the common responsibility for the 
preservation of the integrity and conservation of inter-generational I 
equity of all items forming part of the common heritage of mankind. I 
Thus this study ends with one closing note. Collective responsi-
bility is an effective method to ensure universal respect for the Rulel 
of Law for the benefit of mankind as a whole anywhere, on the high 
seas, in the oceans or in the skies or way up in the outer space with 
the moon and other celestial bodies, yet within the reach of the law a~ 
conceived, interpreted and applied by man. 
106. Id., Article III. 
107. Id., Article IV (1) (a) and (b) and (2). 
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I 
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